

# **HOW THE UPDATED STRATEGY “GOING AT YOU” THAT IS UNDERSTANDABLE FOR EVERYONE WILL ALLOW PACIFICATION OF GAZA AND LEBANON AND WILL PREVENT OTHER AGGRESSIONS**

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**SUMMARY.** Israel's strength should lie in its creative approach to solving the problems that arise before it. And taking into account trends in the socio-economic development of social structures, their interaction, the increasing psychological influence of information technology and the improvement of the art of war, it is proposed to use, in the author's opinion, a rational, updated strategy “Going at You”. Developed on the basis of the author's proposed model of a repeated game the “punishing the blackmailer,” this strategy is aimed at punishing the aggressor and effectively reconciling the opposing sides with minimal losses of IDF fighters and civilians, reducing time and weapons consumption, and fits well with the policy of “Wise Paternalism” in relation to the World surrounding Israel.

**KEY WORDS:** decentralization, triarchy, weapons of mass destruction, repeated games, updated strategy “Going at You”, the policy of “Wise Paternalism.”

## **1. The clear need to take into account trends in the development of tactics and strategy of military operations**

Modern development of technology contributes to the transition from mass consumption and, accordingly, production of any product or service to a subject-oriented economy [1,2]. Such an economy has the inherent feature of decentralizing production and creating a large number of creative and largely independent producers. And such an economic model can be considered as a move away from hierarchical production relations to a heterarchy of many producers [3].

The military industry and the armed forces, which were most sensitive to technological changes and aimed at increasing the effectiveness of their combat operations, responded most quickly to this trend in socio-economic relations. This was expressed in the creation of various types of combat weapons, including intelligent ones, aimed at selective high-precision destruction of the enemy at different distances with minimal cost. This also affected the strategy and tactics of combat operations with their active decentralization. And here, too, there was a transition from hierarchy in combat operations to a creative heterarchy of small military groups, provided with various means of combat.

Accordingly, such new opportunities for conducting combat operations with precision weapons (missiles, drones, cyber and other means) additionally stimulate the decentralization of the production of basic consumer goods.

For Israel, this should primarily concern such a vulnerable area as electricity generation. My report at the first section of the 7th International Scientific and Practical Online Conference “Formation of a comfortable environment in the Mediterranean”, Netanya (Israel), May 19, 2024 [4] spoke about the need for a rapid transition to decentralization of electricity generation, and for this it is necessary develop theoretical foundations of distributed energy that justify such a transition.

And as justification for this, I referred to the statement of Major General Giora Eiland about the vulnerability of Israeli civilian infrastructure, including its power plants, to high-precision weapons [5], as well as to our conferences and seminars at which options for maximum use of solar, wind and wave energy were discussed, proposed and justified the transition to a decentralized energy system in which large power plants would be unnecessary [6].

The vulnerability of Israel's centralized energy can also be seen from the words "We are not ready for war," spoken on June 20, 2024 by Shaul Goldstein, CEO of the Noga company, which is responsible for managing the energy network in all regions of Israel [7].

Thus, in ensuring Israel's security in modern conditions, the decentralization of Israel's energy supply becomes very relevant. And it is impossible to do without the active participation of the state in forecasting, planning, decision-making and support of work performed at the level of a permanent government structure with broad powers.

Next, in relation to the events in Gaza and the growing aggravation of the situation on the border with Lebanon, we will consider how both sides can be pacified for a long time.

In modern conditions, conducting combat operations according to old, well-tested rules becomes ineffective and can lead to a dead end. Moreover, to achieve positive results, taking into account trends and forecasts, you must try to be at least half a body ahead of the enemy. To do this, let us analyze the emerging trends in the conditions of modern military operations.

The widespread transition to a decentralized subject-oriented economy in the future will make the use of high-precision complex weapons ineffective, and they are learning to fight cheaper drones. And gradually, indiscriminate weapons of mass destruction will be used more and more widely, primarily in ground operations.

Under these conditions, there is a need to improve the strategy of combat operations by optimizing goals and objectives for their implementation. Here we will touch upon the basic principles of constructing such a strategy, related to the concepts: hierarchy - corresponding to the principle of strict subordination of the lower levels to the upper; heterarchy – the concept of heterarchy (another power) is complementary to the concept of hierarchy and provides for the presence of a system of intersecting, diverse coexisting management structures. Periodically, the hierarchy breaks down into creative structures of heterarchy. And due to the internal competitive struggle of such structures, the heterarchy is unstable, which leads to hierarchy of a dominant.

Perhaps, in order to prevent the strengthening of indoctrination and a return to hierarchy in combat operations with natural competition in the heterarchy of creative military groups, it will be advisable, using intelligent information technologies, to move from the military hierarchy to a third, more stable robust control system, defined as a triarchy operating within some kind of dynamic heterarchical homeostasis [8] based on the blockchain system.

Changing the strategy of warfare with the widespread use of indiscriminate weapons of mass destruction dramatically changes the psychological aspects of such actions. Since they are directly related to the threat to life for the civilian population and their safety, livelihoods and compensation for losses must be guaranteed to be taken into account. On the other hand, such a strategy can be a psychological factor that can speed up the pacification of the enemy.

Based on ensuring the safety of the enemy's civilian population, apparently, before the start of each combat operation, it is necessary to invite civilians to leave the territory of the proposed hostilities within several days, excluding any surprise for them.

This form of warning the population is reminiscent of the psychological method of influencing the enemy used by the prince of ancient Rus' Svyatoslav, warning him before the start of the battle with the message "Going at You" [9].

## **2. Formation of Updated strategy "Going at You" based on the long-term policy of "Wise Paternalism"**

This successful military technique of Prince Svyatoslav can be developed into a strategy understandable to everyone in the form of Updated strategy "Going at You."

In my opinion, the People of the Book, who suffered on October 7, the day of Simcha Torah, in the current situation should act from the position of Solomon's policy of "Wise Paternalism" [10,11].

In the distant past, the wise King Solomon pursued a policy towards his neighbors that bore shades of paternalism. And a striking example of the legacy of such a policy can be the example of a repatriate from Ethiopia, Mazi Pilip, who, under the Shlomo program, came to Israel at the age of

12 [12]. She served in the landing forces. And the photograph shows this brave defender of Israel (Fig.1).



Fig.1. Mazi Pilip while serving in the Israeli army. (Photo: Facebook)

After serving in the IDF, Mazi Pilip studied at Haifa and Tel Aviv universities. Now this Orthodox Jew, a mother of seven children, lives in the United States and is engaged in social activities. Mazi Pilip enjoys the support of New Yorkers and ran for the US Congress as a Republican in February 2024 (Fig. 2). However, she lost to the Democrat, former Congressman Tom Suozzi [13].

Mazi Pilir is an active supporter of Israel. And this example is indicative.



Fig.2. Mazi Melesa Pilip (Photo: Adam Gray / AFP)

Long-term policy of “Wise Paternalism”, developed in accordance with the historical and cultural experience of Israel and modern provisions such as the concept of “new (soft) paternalism” [14], behavioral economics [15], sociology, must be based on a broad planning horizon based on reasonable goals and forecasts, taking into account the subjective characteristics of the participants and is aimed at ensuring the most comfortable interaction with neighbors within the framework of the triarchy of a certain social homeostasis with an unambiguous and understandable reaction for them in the event of their aggressive actions. And, unlike a policy based on the theory of controlled chaos, which is characterized by a narrow planning horizon and is capable of giving a quick significant effect and an even greater negative effect beyond this horizon, the implementation of a policy of “wise paternalism” requires a more creative subject-oriented and labor-intensive process when its development and its positive results may not appear immediately, but they will have a steadily increasing character.

The Updated strategy “Going at You” (USGY) should fit into such a policy. At the same time, the fundamental differences between the USGY and the strategy of Prince Svyatoslav, in addition to the widespread use of modern means of combat, are the changes in the goals of such a strategy. This is not the defeat of the enemy, but his pacification. And also, instead of short-term influence on the enemy, the use of Solomon’s long-term policy of “Wise Paternalism”, leading to the gradual transformation of the enemy into a mutually beneficial socio-economic structure.

It should be noted that the USGY is in good agreement with the wise provisions of the Torah, which laid the basic scientific foundations of social development. Such as, each person is like the Creator and, accordingly, he himself is the Creator and the second important position is “Love your neighbor as yourself” [16,17]. Both provisions jointly stimulate the socio-economic development of societies that adhere to their principles and their violation leads to those negative disagreements between collective attractors, the elimination of which can help by the USGY.

### **3. “The paradox of blackmail” as a model of Arab-Israeli conflicts and its modification based on the repeated game “punishing the blackmailer”**

In the USGY the psychology of the enemy’s behavior should also be taken into account and, as noted in [18] by the 2005 Nobel Prize laureate in economics for discoveries in the field of Game Theory, prof. Israel Aumann, the aggressive behavior of Hamas resembles the behavior of a blackmailer from “the paradox of blackmail” known in game theory, seeking to dictate his terms.

The meaning of “the paradox of blackmail” is that two participants in the game must divide a large amount of money that they accidentally received. The condition of the game is that if there is no agreement on the division of money, then no one will receive it. In considered in [18] the story, one player demanded 90% of the amount, for which he received the name “blackmailer.” Another player, called “rational”, offered to split the money equally. However, the “blackmailer” refused to change the demand. Because of the threat of not getting anything, the “rational” player had to agree to the “blackmailer’s” demand. It is believed that for a one-time game it is rational to give in to the blackmailer's demand.

Prof. Israel Aumann, who made a major contribution to the theory of repeated games, drawing a parallel between “the paradox of blackmail” used in game theory and the Arab-Israeli conflicts, believes that since conflicts are repeated, they cannot be modeled using a one-time game [19]. A repeated situation must be treated differently than a one-time game, and refusing to make concessions to the enemy when the situation is repeated again due to fear of losses will subsequently force the parties to the conflict to come to a balanced compromise. And he concludes that the State of Israel ignores the basic principles of game theory. If the State of Israel is able to use these principles, its state status and, as a consequence, its defense position will significantly improve [19].

I have to agree with this. At the Ukrainian Technological University, in the course of Theory of Decision Making (DMT), I considered elements of Game Theory and included this material in a methodological manual on DMT [20], including the sgame program I wrote for repeated games in MATLAB for solving matrix games in mixed strategies. And, based on the experience gained, in

[10] a procedure for resolving a conflict situation was presented, taking into account the irrationality inherent in the participants in “the paradox of blackmail” game. For this purpose, the behavior of the participants in the initially one-time game “the paradox of blackmail” was modified, transforming it into the repeated game “punishing the blackmailer.” This modification of the game is consistent with the development trends of Game Theory, which increasingly takes into account the psychological aspects of the participants’ behavior.

At the same time, I proceeded from the fact that human behavior differs from the behavior of a robot programmed to play with a requirement to win with a ratio of, for example, 9 to 1 and not changing the strategy. If we consider the behavior of the “blackmailer” from the perspective of cognitive psychology, which recognizes the irrationality of behavior, then when choosing a strategy, he a priori, assuming a winning ratio of 9 to 1 in his favor, understands that the ratio may be different and, under certain circumstances, could agree to a different ratio.

In the repeated game of “punishing the blackmailer,” an “adequate” player can build his strategy on the irrationality of the “blackmailer’s” behavior. For example, negotiating with a “blackmailer” in the following way: Having offered to distribute the amount equally and, having received a demand from the “blackmailer” to distribute it 9 to 1 with an advantage in his favor, in turn, a more tolerant “adequate” player with a pressure-resistant psyche offers to change the distribution is 4 to 6 in his favor. At the same time, the “blackmailer” is warned that upon receipt of a refusal, a new distribution of 3 to 7 will be offered, and if he agrees, the “blackmailer” will receive a motivational incentive bonus of 5% relative to the total amount and the final distribution will be 4.5 to 5.5. If the parties disagree, such an iterative procedure will be continued with a shift in the distribution of the amount at each step by 1 conventional unit and at the last step of the iteration, with the consent of the “blackmailer,” it will lead to a distribution of 0.5 to 9.5. As a result, for the “blackmailer” such “rational behavior” will give a consolation prize in the form of 5% of the total amount. If he refuses, he will not receive anything, just like the “adequate” player, but the latter gains confidence in a more favorable outcome if the situation is repeated.

In fact, human memory and the decision-making mechanism that works on its basis are such that after 3 outcomes, according to [21,22], a person quite often abruptly changes his behavior strategy and, in this case, a compromise in the game can occur at a ratio of 3 .5 to 6.5 in favor of an “adequate” player. A positive aspect of such a strategy will also be that if the conflict situation between these players is repeated, the experience gained in the relationship can lead to a faster and more equitable distribution. Thus, when using tactics based on the game “punishing the blackmailer,” already at the first conflict situation that arises, the procedure for educating the “blackmailer” is carried out and further interaction between the parties is facilitated.

#### **4. Implementation of the Updated strategy “Going at You”**

In [23], three models of decision-making strategies in conflict situations were considered, which were called “Concessions”, “No peace, no war” and the “Forcing peace” strategy.

The “Concessions” strategy may be rational in a one-time situation, but as stated above, it is unacceptable in repeated conflicts with the Arabs and will only produce a negative result for Israel.

When resolving conflict situations in accordance with the “No peace, no war” strategy, the methods used on both sides are close to the spontaneous tactics of a “blackmailer” and the implementation of controlled chaos technologies. It corresponds to the course of four military operations in the Gaza Strip, observed since December 2008. By now, this strategy has exhausted its capabilities, the enemy has adapted to it, and it can lead to a situation with difficult to predict consequences.

Taking into account the considered model of the repeated game “punishing the blackmailer,” which takes into account the psychological aspects of the behavior of the participants, it can be assumed that Hamas does not understand what a mistake it is making in holding hostages, and this must be actively and thoughtfully used both to return the hostages and to eliminate Hamas’s power in Gaza. Assuming that ultimately the sovereign is the people and without their support Hamas will not survive in Gaza [11]. And it will not be able to hide in tunnels, which, instead of shelters for terrorists, will begin to be used for growing mushrooms and other useful, peaceful purposes.

Based on the current situation with the operation in Gaza, will analyze the tasks assigned to it and their implementation. After the aggressive attack on October 7, carried out by the Hamas organization that governs the Gaza Strip, two goals were set - to destroy the Hamas terrorist organization and free the hostages [24]. To date, these tasks have not been completed.

In my opinion, three tasks should have been set. The first and most important thing is the release of all hostages and the elimination of the military threat to the population of the country at the current time. The second task is to punish the aggressor and record this punishment. The third task is to ensure subsequent long-term effective peace. And to accomplish these tasks, it is proposed to use the USGY, as a development and a significant addition to the strategy "Forcing peace" discussed in [23].

How could this be accomplished? Let's consider the implementation of these tasks with minimal costs and losses for Israel.

Apparently, Israeli military analysts in the new conditions, taking into account the emerging trend of conducting combat operations with indiscriminate weapons of mass destruction (WMD), need to move away from stereotypes of thinking that are often very useful in military affairs, allowing rational decision-making. And when planning combat operations, do not focus on the high-cost and ineffective strategy of using precision weapons in order to minimize civilian casualties during ground operations. These losses can be more effectively minimized by prior warning to the local part of the population about a WMD strike on the intended area. And in every possible way facilitate his evacuation within the agreed time frame. For the conditions of the Gaza Strip, this is quite realistic and, moreover, has been confirmed in practice by the rapid mass displacement of the civilian population during hostilities [25]. Such a change in military strategy would significantly reduce IDF losses, dramatically speed up the conduct of combat operations and reduce their costs.

It should be noted that in order to counter WMD carriers, there must be an intensified development of air defense and missile defense systems, and this must also be taken into account.

If we assume that the USGY would have begun to be used immediately after October 7, using at its first stage the method of warfare discussed above, this is how it practically could look:

Based on the main of the three tasks - the release of all hostages and the elimination of the military threat to the population of our country, the Israeli government announces a demand to release all hostages within 3 days and stop shelling. And, if these requirements are not met, it announces the start of a military operation, in accordance with the rules of warfare that are clear to everyone and fair, until the requirements are fully met. And it instructs the IDF to carry out this operation. Next, the IDF begins to use USGY"

The IDF, for example, taking into account the range of indiscriminate weapons of mass destruction, declares the northern part of Gaza, 500 meters deep, a dangerous zone and demands that the civilian population leave it within 3 days. After this, a WMD strike is carried out on this territory, it is cleared with bulldozers and protected mobile checkpoints are created. This makes it possible to minimize the loss of IDF personnel.

Further, the demand is again made for the release of all hostages and the cessation of shelling. If it is not fulfilled, the IDF, after a 3-day break, again advances deeper into Gaza. And so, following the model of a repeated game "punishing the blackmailer," the IDF acts until the demand is fulfilled.

Hypothetically, it can be assumed that during the time elapsed from October 7, 2023. The IDF would have cleared the entire Gaza Strip. But most likely much earlier, either Hamas would have released the hostages or the rioting Gazans would have put an end to Hamas.

After completing the first part of the operation, in order to consolidate the victory psychologically and increase the level of Israeli defense, it is proposed to create well-fortified checkpoints in the border area of Gaza, which was occupied by the IDF. As proposed in 2014 in my article "Victory must have a symbol or how to achieve sustainable peace" [23].

However, this did not happen. The fighting in the Gaza Strip has been going on for almost nine months, the goals have not been achieved and, given Israel's unclear policy, it is under intense pressure to withdraw troops from Gaza.

What can be done under these conditions? Perhaps we should return to the starting point and continue to conduct the operation in Gaza and the confrontation with Hezbollah according to the rules of the USGY that are understandable to the world community.

On the one hand, during active hostilities in ground operations by the IDF, Hamas's combat capability was sharply reduced and this may facilitate and speed up the subsequent operation in Gaza. On the other hand, the withdrawal of troops from Gaza will dramatically reduce tensions in confrontation with the Hezbollah organization on the border with Lebanon.

In the future, any subsequent aggressive action on the border with Lebanon can be considered as a reason for declaring a military operation understandable to the Lebanese residents on the basis of USGY with the presentation of the rules of engagement to their government. And after this, let the Lebanese people themselves deal with their aggressive structures towards Israel. As a last resort, to ensure its security, Israel can expand its territory to the Litani River.

After peace in the Gaza Strip, Israel will need to move on to the implementation of the third long-term task to ensure subsequent long-term effective peace on the basis of the USGY. At the same time, the initiative in stabilizing the situation should primarily belong to Israel, which has clear advantages in technological innovation and significant economic and military potential.

Israeli politicians appear to be making a mistake in setting themselves the task of destroying the terrorist organization Hamas. Even if Hamas is physically destroyed, an equally aggressive organization may take its place.

Hamas must reject the people of Gaza and this can be helped by a number of measures. At the same time, we will proceed from the fact that, according to the Pareto principle, 20% of the population is politically active and we can assume that 20% of them (Pareto's matryoshka principle), i.e. 4% of the population will be dissatisfied with the current government. Further, of the remaining 80%, approximately half are sensitive to indoctrination by strong authorities and their stereotypical behavior, without thinking, will support strong power [26]. The second half of the inactive part of the population is more rational in their behavior and can be classified as *Homo rationabilis*.

Thus, at the moment a strong government is established in the Gaza Strip, it will a priori have at least 44% support from the population. Considering that after the hostilities it will be necessary to restore housing and the economy, the provisions of the USGY must stipulate the conditions for cooperation with the leadership of the Gaza Strip on such activities and make sure that this is known to the population of Gaza. With the high efficiency of such cooperation, support for the authorities in Gaza can reach the maximum possible value of 96%. And the Gaza elite itself will strive to maintain mutually beneficial relations with Israel. Provided, of course, that the dominant influence of external forces is excluded. And this is the task for Israel to maintain a certain homeostasis based on Solomon's policy of "Wise Paternalism."

## **Conclusions**

One can hope that the use of a rational and, if necessary, forceful, understandable and fair Modernized "Going at You" strategy will allow high-tech Israel not only to pacify Gaza and Lebanon, but also to prevent other aggressive attempts for many years, and will also make it possible to significantly reduce IDF losses during combat operations, dramatically speed them up and reduce costs.

In such extreme situations as now, the presence of a well-thought-out development strategy could help justify and implement even the most stringent measures to restore order to protect people's lives.

Israel doesn't owe anyone anything. It must ensure security and prosperity for itself and, as a system open to the outside world, from the standpoint of Solomon's policy of "Wise Paternalism", it must influence the process of formation of Palestinian entities.

A long-term policy of "Wise Paternalism" will help improve relations with immediate neighbors and subsequently lay the foundation for the transition to a stable triarchy operating within the framework of a dynamic heterarchical homeostasis of social structures.

Relying on the acquired authority in the region and the support of major world powers interested in long-term cooperation with Israel, and therefore being its natural allies, it will be easier to explain their position in the external arena and achieve positive results.

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